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       Reading Anna  Strhan's paper led me to consider the problems of locating 
       religious education and moral education in relation to current Japanese 
       education. I will respond to the question of religious education in  Strhan's paper 
       and consider her interpretation of the insights within  Levinas's thinking. Then, 
       after exploring the problem of the relation between morality and education in 
       Japan, I will consider relations between morality and religion from a Levinasian 
       standpoint. At first, I will analyze the problem of subject (subjectivity) in the 
       critical realist model in Religious Education. Next, I will deal with the meaning 
       of  'being religious' and  'ethics' within Levinas' thought. To conclude, I would 
       like to comment upon how we might search for an-other religious education from 
       the point of view of ethicality in  Levinas' thought as a reconsideration of daily 
 life. I will then reconsider religious education through the perspective that 
       Levinas opens up, to retain the possibility of speaking about religion after being 
       released  from various theoretical forms of  private' religion, in other words, 
       speaking about  ` religiousness' beyond the framework of  ` belief  ' In this sense, I 
       will suggest  Strhan's study contributes to the question of whatreligious education 
          is. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reading  Strhan's paper led me to consider the problems of locating religious education (RE) 
and moral education in relation to current Japanese education (Strhan,  2010a). I will respond to 
the question of religious education in Strhan's paper and consider her interpretation of the 
insights within Levinas's thinking. Then, after exploring the problem of the relation between 
morality and education in Japan, I will consider relations  between morality and religion from a 
Levinasian standpoint. I will begin by briefly outlining the Japanese educational context with 
regard to religious and moral education. 
 Religion is assumed to be private rather than public in modern Japanese society; it is not 
located within society as a public institution. In terms of education, in Article 20 of the 
Constitution of Japan, Article 9 on the Fundamental Law of Education orders that religion is to 
be respected, but that institutions of education, as national organizations, must not provide 
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religious education, or any other religious activity. These regulations apply to religious education 
within public educational institutions. In the many private schools, however, basic information 
about religion is taught as a compulsory subject as well as a part of moral education. 
 Against such a background, the opportunity that many Japanese have to experience religion 
within the framework of religious education is limited. Yet this does not mean that religion is 
entirely absent from Japanese schooling as students might, for example, read Buddhist and 
Christian writings in Japanese or in Morality classes. Moreover, there is the opportunity to hear 
teachings of Buddhism, Shintoism and Christianity in educational spaces beyond  school.' 
However, as religious education is not a formal or compulsory part of Japanese education, I will 
consider here the aim of moral education in Japan, before returning to the question of religious 
education more broadly. I would like to consider Strhan's paper with reference to moral 
education as related to social norms and individuals' values, while considering carefully the 
difference between religion and morality. 
 In a general sense, moral education involves not only instilling moral norms but also guiding 
and supporting the student to  'become moral' and to be able to form their own answers to the 
question  'what is morality?', or  'what is a morally desirable being?'. In other words, the aim of 
moral education is to guide and support the student to acquire social customs and to be able 
to respond to social demands. In Japan, this purpose is expressed as  'Cultivating Morality' 
 (`Guidelines for the Course of Study for Junior High School', 2008). 
 In 2006, the Fundamental Law of Education was revised with respect to how morality was to 
be evaluated. The ideal of  `patriotism'—`to nurture an attitude  .  .  . to love our country and our 
home'—was included. This, the government claimed, would not contradict Article 19, which 
states that freedom of thought and conscience should not be violated. As a result, however, many 
people concerned with education drew attention to the danger of the nation intervening in 
something that it is believed should remain a private question for individual Japanese. Despite 
these concerns, the curriculum guidance on patriotism was implemented in many elementary 
schools, and some began to evaluate patriotism on a grading system of three levels. This could 
be seen as indoctrinating students into a kind of social norm and  'desirable sense of value' by 
locating  'morality' as a school  'subject' under the name (or slogan)  'Cultivating Morality'. This 
approach is problematic, therefore, as it makes morality an object of compulsory evaluation. 
 This problem relates to Strhan's doubts about the phenomenological model that aims at 
 `deepening interfaith dialogue' and  'being more tolerate'. This raises some questions: 
    • What are the criteria of human internal development? 
    • Should religion or morality be evaluated? 
    • Should we (teachers) teach the student conventional right or wrong? 
    • Does understanding follow on from belief, or does belief follow understanding in religion? 
The different answers to these questions would have significance for reconsidering the problem 
of indoctrination in religion. If morality at the stage of  'belief'  is not considered to have 
rationality in itself, it would make sense to ask the same kinds of questions about morality as 
Strhan asks about religion. In other words, the problems of religion and morality are the same 
as those of belief and  reason.' In relation to belief and intelligibility, Levinas says that 
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 ` intelligibility' is making  'all significance
, all rationality, go back to being' (Levinas, 1986, p. 
112),  `belief as the religious life is the relation to the divine itself that transcends existence, 
aspiring  'to a beyond, to deeper than oneself—aspiring to a transcendence different from the out-
of-oneself that the intentional consciousness opens and traverses (Levinas, 1986, p.  110). 
Important for the discussion to come, then, is the idea of  'the relation to the divine' as discourse, 
 `the idea of infinity come to me'  (idee-de-l'Infini-en-moi) in Levinas' thinking (Levinas, 1986, 
p. xiv). 
THE PROBLEM OF  SUBJECT  (IVITY) IN THE CRITICAL REALIST MODEL 
        WE ARE GROWING UP WITH LEARNING WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO. 
                         (Advertisement aimed at preventing minors from smoking)
I will now provide a brief example of a recent event in Japanese education to provide some 
illustration for the discussion that follows on moral education and social norms. 
 Last year, a smoking room was set up for students in a private high school. This raised the 
issue of allowing high school students to smoke in school. As a result, the prefectural police were 
sent the papers of the principal and teachers involved, which were then passed to the Public 
Prosecutors Office. This case, I would like to suggest, provides a starting point from which to 
respond to Strhan's paper that overlaps with my own concerns as a teacher in a correspondence 
high school, where the students have various problems. 
  It was reported in the news that smoking and truancy, for example, were common among the 
students before entering this school. Students had been smoking before the smoking room was 
set up. Previously, in this high school, smoking was neither allowed nor condoned. But, as the 
principal and teachers had already discussed repeatedly how to help students to stop smoking, 
they tried instead to provide educational guidance as a means to help the students to stop 
smoking gradually. At first, they encouraged the students to smoke only in the smoking room. 
This was intended to gradually decrease their smoking, in the hope that they would eventually 
stop smoking altogether. 
 The fundamental principle informing this approach is the need to stop young people under 20 
years old smoking. However, minors' smoking is not such a simple problem that they come to 
stop smoking by being taught the current social norm that  'smoking is unwholesome'. In school, 
however, school personnel aim to teach students to abide by principles and rules. If students 
violate these, they will be forced to respond by punishing students by various means. The 
smoking room, however, as an alternative approach, is an experiment with more effective 
methods of enforcing social and moral norms that use the sort of psychological understanding 
that is used in everyday situations. 
 This type of conflict situation, arising from a dispute over social norms, happens frequently in 
the daily life of educational institutions, and is clearly not limited to the problem of minors' 
smoking. The problem of deviation from social norms continually raises the question of how the 
teacher should respond to both the social norm and the student, before the question of how they 
guide the student toward a right response. In this case, right or wrong aside, the school personnel 
neither ignored the social norm, nor took an attitude of overlooking the students' smoking. Could 
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we, therefore, regard it as a practice that aimed to wait for the students' awareness of social 
norms positively, whilst at the same time guiding them? The approach of not being obedient to 
the social norm by understanding it as given from outside, but rather building the norm within 
each student might be related to  'the critical realist model' that Strhan  discusses.' 
 The case outlined above relates, therefore, to the problem of the ideal approach to ethics 
education in Japan. The educational purpose of  'Ethics' in the high school is understood as 
follows: 
 [h] aving the student deepen their understanding and meditation of self-formation, being and 
    way of life as human whilst young, having them improve the practical motivation that to form 
    character, encourages them to establish the self as a living subject. Bringing up the necessary 
    ability and attitude as citizens who have good sense, with the spirit of respect for human 
    (Ministry of Education, Culture, sports, science and technology Japan, 2008). 
The study of  'Ethics' in school demands that students are able to deepen their meditation on their 
own problems, by understanding ancient thought as knowledge in an inclusive sense. In that 
process, struggling with various insoluble problems in human life, they come to try to form their 
inner life. 
 This idea of ethics education is connected with the question of how the critical realist model 
of RE might bring  'awareness' within each student in relation to the ideal of  'cultivating the 
student's autonomy'. Let us reconsider Andrew Wright's argument, as presented by Strhan. 
Strhan agrees with his idea that the role of RE should not be to indoctrinate within Christianity 
and to learn the Bible, but should offer the learning opportunity to reconsider religious and social 
truths critically. However, she does not seem to agree with the emphasis on rational justification 
in this model. Rather, she highlights the fundamental questions of what we can and should 
examine under the name of God within RE. Considering this in relation to classroom planning, 
the following questions arise: 
    • Should RE have a curriculum appropriate for training the elite, to acquire the skills of 
        problem-solving and to improve social adaptability, to deepen self-understanding? Or 
    • Should RE have similar teaching methods to other subject disciplines? 
The quotation at the beginning of this section,  'WE ARE GROWING UP WITH LEARNING 
WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO', describes the process of human growth from the point 
of view of  'possibility and impossibility'.4 But, ethics is not, I would argue, a question of  ` can/ 
cannot' but whether I am accepted or not in the relation to others. 
 If we follow Levinas, the autonomous subject doesn't transform herself to belong to social 
discourses, before responding to others, but substitutes herself for the other as the subject takes 
on responsibility for others. RE might contribute to disclosing the manifestation of the other as 
far as RE keeps asking the question  'what is human maturity?' with respect to the relation 
between the human and  God.' It is necessary to refer to Levinas's use of the idea of ethical 
subject (subjectivity) in relation to this, which he considers to be suffering, atoning for the other. 
Because  [I] become as substitution for the other not by my identification but by myself being 
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dis-identified. In other words, it is as a sensitive being who is receptive to the approach of the 
other that I have already been accepted by others unconditionally, whilst at the same time, I am 
always already responsible for the other. This describes how I become by myself through the 
revelation of the other in a way that is different from how ethics education conceives of 
becoming moral as becoming someone who can give faithful judgment to traditional moral and 
social norms. I understand Strhan as suggesting that RE cannot lead to ethical subjectivity in a 
Levinasian mode as long as it follows the critical realist model in trying to explain relations with 
God. Considering the location of  'self-understanding' from Levinas' view, it could be very 
important in an interpretation of the relation between  'deepening self-understanding' and 
 `listening to the voice from the other' (or  'responding to the  other'). In other words, the task is 
to question the plausibility of the theory of the causal relationship in reconsidering this problem. 
THE MEANING OF  'BEING RELIGIOUS' AND  'ETHICS' WITHIN LEVINAS' THOUGHT 
Religious Education may be divided into the following five categories according to their 
different purposes: 1) Confessional religious education; 2) Religious knowledge education; 
3) Safety education against religion; 4) Religious tolerance education; 5) Religious cultivation 
of aesthetic sentiments. Strhan appears to favour  'Religious cultivation of aesthetic sentiments' 
in particular. 
 Teaching religion as knowledge in Religious knowledge education (2) is concerned, in 
Levinasian terms, with the said about God or with  'being religious' as following stated religious 
 doctrines.' This might be different from the commitment to religiosity, being able to explain 
about the religion, or to respond to the question,  'What is the religion?', for this is education as 
a the process of language acquisition. Levinas describes the experience that commits to 
religiosity in terms of  'transcendence'. To give the example of tolerance: tolerance will be more 
deeply learned by facing others than by knowing what  'tolerance' is. However, I also think that 
it is very important to investigate various ethical problems critically, in the process of the 
formation of autonomous subjects. Ethical subjectivity in Levinas' thought does not manifest 
itself in the process of learning. That is to say that being ethical in a Levinasian sense is not 
something that can be evaluated as a  'learning outcome'. It is not a competence chieved once and 
for all. In that respect, it is different from the critical realist model. Levinas expresses the ethical 
relation as follows: 
   The ethical fact owes nothing to values; it is values that owe everything to the ethical fact 
    (Levinas 1986, p.  147). 
The ethical relation is not the same as  'Morality' or  'Communication'. It is not an ethics about 
anything but rather ethics as existing for another; the meaning of ethics is not constructed but 
searched for. Ethics will start where (or when)  `I' acknowledge  'the Other' beyond  'the  self. 
Ethics is not like practical knowledge (or applied knowledge) in Levinas' thought. 
Transcendence within ethics is to tear off the individual from the social totality, at the same time, 
to be reflected within that totality under the responsibility for others. In an education that 
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emphasizes this aspect of the ethical,  'knowing' that  'God is merciful' means  'Be merciful as 
well as God': this might mean to hear and follow the other's voice. We do not learn practical 
knowledge but break into the relation with God through others. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN-OTHER RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
To conclude, I would like to comment upon how we might search for an-other religious 
education from the point of view of ethicality in Levinas' thought as a way of reconsidering our 
daily lives. It is difficult to establish universal religious education. It might be argued that the 
public role of religious education should be to prepare dialogical places where people who have 
different values and beliefs talk mutually, based upon their different (religious) experiences. As 
a result, I am led to reconsider religious education in this broader public sense through 
the perspective that Levinas opens up, to retain the possibility of speaking about religion after 
being released from various theoretical forms of  'private' religion, that is, speaking about 
 `religiousness' beyond the framework of  ` belief. In both senses, Strhan's study contributes to 
the question of what religious education  is.' 
  In recent history, the specific aims and purposes of education have developed according to the 
demands of capitalism. Perhaps within our current situation, their meaning and importance have 
lessened. Communication with others and social norms are unstable and therefore under these 
circumstances, the relation between self and other should be seen as a manifestation of the 
processes of ethical subjectivity. This can demonstrate the  'missing' or rather  'missed' ethical 
core of the current frameworks of education. It is possible that a model of RE that attends to the 
challenges of Levinas may produce a new style of speaking about education in our daily lives, 
always maintaining tense relations with public education, without being subsumed within such 
frameworks. In this context of rapidly shifting social norms, I intend to pay close attention to 
what directions religious education in Britain and Japan will take in the future. 
THE SPACE OPENED UP AFTER THE DIALOGUE 
The way in which Strhan's study and practice of religious education connects with Levinas' 
thought hinges on the interpretation of the term  'religion'. One of the clear similarities between 
academic subjects cultivating aesthetic sensibilities, for example, literature, art, history, etc. and 
religious education, is in their concern with interpretation. In many subjects, educational practice 
is oriented toward a goal. In religious education, however, remaining unbounded by a particular 
interpretation or sense of value is very important. In other words, the central issue is to 
understand religion in complex and various ways. Understanding the diversity of society, culture, 
and traditions might require extending ourselves beyond a particular interpretation. In studies 
such as the humanities, for example, literature, art, history, etc., this entails considering the 
relation between a text and its interpreter. 
 When we interpret a kind of practice, we lead rightfully to different  'truths' by way of 
interpretation. In education, in particular, teachers take the initiative to present a subject and its 
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criteria in their planning and acting. To facilitate students' absorption of the above-mentioned 
educational practices, I think that the practice of religious education might contribute to the idea 
of  'education as text', or open up a space for reconsidering educational practice from Strhan's 
viewpoint. That is:  'My sense that there is something wrong with the current model of religious 
education arises from experience rather than rational argument' (Strhan,  20l  Oh). This suggests 
a significant point from which to reconsider the question,  'What is religious?'. 
 Religious practice in Japan brings the perspective of pathos, rather than the perspective of 
logos, regarding experience as understanding. I think that the  'religious education' that Strhan 
advocates is made possible not by reflecting on our own personal experiences, but through a 
dialogue with a text that we can share.  'Transcendence' is not a problem of  'personal' 
transcendence, the Divine, but lies beyond the  'personal' dimension as the practice of opening 
a space to accept something we cannot  understand.' 
NOTES 
 1. When I entered a Protestant university, I attended a religious education class for the first time. In the class, the 
    Bible was taught, and I remember that I learned the movement of Zionism. 
 2.  `ZiZek's theorization of religious belief also emphasizes that it cannot be reduced to knowledge' (Strhan, 2010). 
    Paul Ricoeur (ADD DATE) investigates the concept of  'belief'  in detail. 
 3. Actually, however, many students are forced to remember what is written in the textbook in Ethics Education 
     classes. 
 4. Levinas points out the danger of using the term of  'we' among the people who believe in the same religion on his 
    essay Entre nous (Levinas, 1991). 
 5. In addition, it is necessary to study the concept of  'maturity' and  'education' in Levinas' thought. 
 6. Levinas ays that Christianity would incline toward legitimate doctrine, indicating the problem of thematizing God 
    in religious experience (Levinas, 1990). 
 7. Interpreting the idea of  'Religious Public' in Levinas' thought, it is that the closing of the self is destroyed by 
    being exposed to  'the Other' that transcends the self. I think that her practice as discussed in part 4 of Strhan's 
    paper corresponds closely to the idea of  'Religious Public'. 
 8. I thank Paul Standish and Naomi Hodgson for their help in revising the original version of this paper. 
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